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The souvlaki connection: some reflections
on the Greek public debt crisis
Chiara Oldani* and Paolo Savona**
 After the subprime credit crisis of 2007, the world is no longer what we thought.
An unprecedented crisis of confidence was combined with a credit crunch, and
the G20 countries had to enact massive public spending programmes to save the
economy and at least buffer the inevitable hard landing. In 2010 this excessive
public spending produced the first public debt crisis in the wake of the subprime
crisis: Greece reported that in 2009 it had run an unprecedented deficit of 15.4
per cent of GDP, and that its public debt had skyrocketed to 126.8 per cent. The
Greek crisis is the product of years of recession, the sluggish economic
environment and poor productivity – but above all it is the product of the
mismanagement of the public finances and of unsatisfactory reporting
practices. In this essay we analyze this crisis in the context of the era of
financial derivatives and underscore a number of crucial effects that have been
largely ignored in both academic discussion and public debate.
1. Public debt management in the age of derivatives
Financial innovation affects fiscal policy in two different ways: first,
it assists tax avoidance by smart taxpayers; and second, it can be used
by government itself to lower the cost of borrowing and improve the
public sector’s cash and debt management (OECD, 2002). For
taxpayers, derivatives are useful for tax timing, i.e. postponing
revenues and realizing losses, so as to lower taxable income, hence
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the tax liability. This has been demonstrated for both firms and
households (see Zeng, 2003 and 2004; Salcedo, 2003; Oldani and
Savona, 2005). The end result is a loss of total general government
revenues. In helping taxpayers to lower their costs, derivatives
demonstrate their essential nature – they serve to shift risks and satisfy
the needs of those who resort to them more efficiently than traditional
financial instruments. 
The public sector may be allowed to use derivatives and
securitization for debt management. Securitization is a way of pooling
an institution’s credit claims and other financial assets as asset-backed
securities for sale on the market. The assets are generally held by a
tax-neutral special purpose vehicle that issues rated debt to fund the
purchase of the assets. Derivatives employed for public debt
management are swaps, forward rate agreements or others, depending
on rules, needs, debt structure and characteristics.
At European level there is little coordination of domestic fiscal
policies, resulting in heterogeneity and asymmetry in the Union.
Changes to budget rules within the EU are coordinated and instituted
by the Commission, but the pace of financial innovation is
incomparably faster than the regulators. The European System of
Accounts (ESA 1995) was adopted in 2000, but derivatives were not
then commonly used by member state governments, so no specific
statistical rules for such transactions were envisaged. As a
consequence, the EU statistical community had to develop specific
guidelines for the recording of government securitization operations
(in the form of a Eurostat decision in July 2002) and for the recording
of financial derivatives (issued in March 2008). These modifications are
basically the result of international regulatory reform (Oldani, 2008). 
In June 2008 the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
issued Statement No. 53, “Accounting and Financial Reporting for
Derivative Instruments” (SGAS 53). This requires derivatives to be
carried at fair value. If a derivative qualifies for hedge accounting, fair
value changes are deferred until specified termination events occur.
Public institutions can use hedge accounting when the derivative
effectively reduces the risk. The real effectiveness of the hedge must be
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assessed by methods that are themselves prescribed in the standard.
There are disclosure requirements, such as a derivative summary,
information on hedge effectiveness, fair value, management objectives,
significant terms, and risks. Because derivatives and hedges are now
common practices, public institutions must pay attention to the
transition period and the date the standard goes into effect. Although the
standard goes into effect for fiscal year 2010, institutions must value their
derivative instruments at the end of fiscal year 2009; the standard would
be applied retroactively for hedges deemed effective. Instruments not
deemed effective in fiscal year 2009 would be subject to a transition
adjustment and reported as a restatement of initial net assets.
According to the IMF (2001), “Sovereign debt management is the
process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
government’s debt in order to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals the government may have set, such as developing
and maintaining an efficient market for government securities.” This
definition describes how a government can manage its debt but
neglects the indirect effects of innovative financial operations. Public
sector use of derivatives will produce cost savings and benefit
domestic and international financial markets, increasing liquidity and
enhancing the efficiency of public deficit and debt management. But at
the same time financial innovation could directly heighten market,
credit, liquidity and counterparty risks over an indeterminate period,
thus running counter to financial stability. OTC derivatives can also
indirectly induce different forms of risk, due to the opacity of trading
and of settlement systems and inadequate standards of accounting and
registration. Moreover, the interaction between the central and local
authorities practicing financial innovation can alter the financial
equilibrium and the allocation of resources.
Financial innovation, with its potential cost savings, is especially
attractive for countries with high public debt or tight budget
constraints, like European countries (Oldani, 2008). But the use of
these devices requires proper accounting, monitoring and oversight
authorities to limit moral hazard.
Tsatsiki connection: some reflections on Greece public debt crisis
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   The public accounts of EU member states are subject to a series
of limitations. The law of motion of debt is described in equation (1):
the public debt is the result of primary budget deficits and interest
payments. European countries are required to control deficits under
the constraint of debt convergence to 60 per cent of GDP. The
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties specify that the deficit cannot
exceed 3 per cent of GDP, except in cases of war and economic
recession (i.e. GDP actually decreasing).
Bt = Bt-1  - rtBt-1 +(Gt - Tt)                                   (1)
limt-n      Bt / Yt < 60 per cent                         (2) 
(Gt - Tt) /Yt < 3 per cent                                 (3) 
Derivatives can be considered as a means of smoothing the cost of
debt (rtBt-1), hedging the outstanding debt (Bt, Bt-1) and managing the
deficit, i.e. increasing revenues and decreasing expenses (Gt - Tt). The
IMF standards do allow OTC contracts, but since 2009 their use has
been severely limited by the requirement for governments to report
the fair value of their operations on a yearly basis (that is, they cannot
wait until the transaction matures). After 2010 we will have a broad
picture of how governments use OTC markets to manage their debt. In
the meantime, attention focuses on Greece.
2. Greek financial operations from 2000 to 2002
Piga (2001) examined the use of interest and exchange rate swaps
by European states prior to Monetary Union, concluding that some
countries used these instruments not only to hedge and reduce public
debt risks but also as window-dressing – shifting interest payments
forward in order to reduce deficit and debt ratios and qualify for
membership in the Monetary Union. Greece is part of this group, as is
Italy. The key point, however, is that the Greek window-dressing
continued even after adoption of the single currency. Since 2000 the
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1 http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0803z.htm 
Commission has revised the official Greek data repeatedly, most
severely in 2004 and 2009. 
The story is still not clear and we can only attempt to disentangle
the various operations undertaken by Greece. First, currency and
interest rate swaps were underwritten in 2000-02. Greece used cross-
currency basis swap agreements to hedge interest and exchange rate
risks. The Bank for International Settlements describes how these
contracts work. This instrument “is a contract in which one party
borrows one currency from another party and simultaneously lends the
same value, at current spot rates, of a second currency to that party.
The parties involved in basis swaps tend to be financial institutions,
either acting on their own or as agents for non-financial corporations.
The chart below (Figure 1) illustrates the flow of funds involved in a
euro/US dollar swap. At the start of the contract, A borrows X·S USD
from, and lends X·EUR to, B. During the contract term, A receives EUR
3M Libor+  from, and pays USD 3M Libor to, B every three months,
where is the price of the basis swap, agreed upon by the counterparties
at the start of the contract. When the contract expires, A returns X·S
USD to B, and B returns X·EUR to A, where S is the same FX spot rate
as of the start of the contract. Though the structure of cross-currency
basis swaps differs from foreign exchange swaps, the former basically
serve the same economic purpose as the latter, except for the exchange
of floating rates during the contract term.”1
Greece swapped its domestic interest rates and exchange rate to
smooth the cost of debt. This procedure was legitimate from 2000 to
2002 and Greece entered into such swaps with Goldman Sachs.
A comprehensive EU report on this issue (EU, 2010) uses harsh
terms to describe the conduct of the Greek authorities: “deliberate
misreporting,” “methodological problems,” “unsatisfactory technical
procedures in the Greek statistical institute,” “inappropriate
governance,” “poor cooperation and lack of clear responsibilities”. The
EU notes that “the most recent revisions are an illustration of the lack
Tsatsiki connection: some reflections on Greece public debt crisis
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of quality of Greek fiscal statistics … and show that the progress in the
compilation of fiscal statistics in the country, and the intense scrutiny
by Eurostat since 2004, have not sufficed to bring the quality of Greek
fiscal data to the level reached by other EU Member States”. It goes on
to admit that “Eurostat is at present not in a position to validate figures
which are of acceptable statistical quality.” The defeat is hard to
manage in Brussels.
Greece deliberately carried out a series of financial operations that
were not properly reported. In 2000-02 Greece entered into currency and
interest rate swaps with Goldman Sachs to hedge risks and reduce the
cost of debt. At the time these transactions were compliant with
European accounting rules (which were substantially non-existent).
Goldman Sachs reports in February 2010 that these transactions
produced a debt reduction of €2.367 billion. However, Goldman Sachs
has not signed any other derivative contract with Greece since 2004, in
accordance with Eurostat rules. The cost reduction was produced by the
effective currency hedge (of the drachma with the dollar and the yen),
and interest rate hedging. Greece closed out its swap deals after 2002 but
misreported the remaining streams of interest; in the 2005 and 2008
revisions the effects were incorporated and the data revised retroactively.
According to the EU, this was a case of deliberate misreporting.
3. The situation from 2004 to 2009
In 2004 and 2005, with the application of new Eurostat rules,
swaps contracts were closed out; the resulting costs or gains were
counted towards the fiscal outturn in these years. Terminating the
contracts before scheduled maturity meant amortizing the costs
over a shorter period, and the reduction in the cost of the debt was
wiped out (as it was not realized). As a result the net present value
turned negative, aggravating the deficit in 2004 and 2005. But
Greece did not record these events properly in the accounts.2 The
2 EU report (2010), p. 22.
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EU revised Greek data, sharply raising debt and deficit ratios. 
According to the EU report and the press,3 Greece continued to
enter into swaps after 2005 but not directly. That is, it acted through
other institutions, as the EU report  describes in detail. The Greek
government financed the deficit through the National Bank of Greece
(a commercial bank), violating the Maastricht rules. In 2008 the
National Bank of Greece accessed European Central Bank refinancing,
posting as collateral notes issued by Titlos Plc. Titlos Plc is a Special
Purpose Vehicle – created by the National Bank of Greece itself
together with Goldman Sachs – that sold €5.1 billion worth of notes
maturing in February 2039 to the National Bank of Greece. But the
National Bank is wholly owned by the Greek Treasury, so this would
appear to be a way of financing the debt but circumventing controls
and prohibitions. The end result is that the Treasury’s deficit was
securitized through the National Bank of Greece, which gets liquidity
from the ECB thanks to the Titlos notes. The final cost of the Greek
debt is thus the ECB’s main refinancing rate. These operations
represent a fraudulent violation of European accounting rules, in that
they do not reflect the greater risk of the Greek sovereign debt (as
measured by its spread with respect to German and other European
Treasury bonds).
In December 2009 the European Central Bank published a legal-
studies working paper entitled “Withdrawal and expulsion from the
EU and EMU.” Apart from the publication’s timing, which is hard to
see as merely coincidental, the conclusion is that the extreme solution
(expulsion) cannot be precluded; it is just very complicated, now that
the Lisbon Treaty has been adopted and a very large majority would
be required. An easier solution would be voluntary withdrawal from
the EU, which would certainly be less expensive for all concerned. A
member state’s withdrawal from the EMU would certainly have an
adverse impact on the credibility of the monetary union itself, but it
would also strengthen the constraints for those that remain. The
Tsatsiki connection: some reflections on Greece public debt crisis
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balance between pros and cons is not merely economic, of course,
and the final decision has already been taken. The Ecofin Council  has
moved to save Greece.
4. The rescue plan of 2010
The Greek crisis exploded in January 2010, and the government
was forced to undertake a severe austerity plan. According to official
releases, the deficit will be reduced by spending reductions (sharp
cuts in civil servants’ pay and benefits), pension reform (whose effects
will be realized over a decade) and tax increases (VAT from 19 per
cent to 21 per cent and the elimination of many tax deductions and
exemptions). The austerity plan projects the public debt going down
to 100 per cent of GDP by 2020. A Financial Stability Fund will be
formed to stabilize liquidity.
These measures should ease the burden of public spending and
produce annual budget surpluses. The most complicated aspects of
the plan will be slimming Greece’s bloated public sector and
eliminating massive tax evasion (especially of VAT).  These two
problems cannot be solved by spending cuts alone. Organizational
overhaul is needed. 
In March 2010 Greece asked for the help of the EU and the IMF.
After prolonged discussion, a 3-year rescue plan worth €110 billion
was agreed on. The rating of Greek bonds fell to BB+, and most of the
Greek debt is now sold off-market, in order to avoid excessive interest
payments. The yield on Greek sovereign bonds has trended upward
throughout the year. 
The parliamentary elections of October 2010 returned the majority
of Prime Minister George Papandreou (Pasok party), thereby
confirming popular backing for his draconian austerity plan. The
spending cuts are combined with reduced public hiring, at the
expense of the younger generations. The public sector overhaul
provokes social and political conflict, fuels disorder and decreases the
likelihood of success.
At present an unknown proportion of the Greek debt is held by
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foreign investors, which in the view of international analysts may
undermine its long-run sustainability. To avert another Russian-style
crisis, the IMF and the EU make regular visits to Greece to verify the
country’s effective ability to implement the plan.
5. Conclusion: no happy ending
Following the underestimation of the risks and repercussions of
mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, the Greek crisis
confirms that the world has changed with the spread of derivatives in
global financial markets. Complex derivatives make transactions and
balance sheets more opaque, opening up opportunities for subprime
and predatory lending and the mismanagement of public debt. The
GASB principles will ensure better measurement of countries’ effective
risk exposure, but they will also make total balance sheet size more
dependent on financial market cycles and increase the volatility of the debt. 
The EU documents make it clear that Greece did not actually
violate proper accounting rules, which were not introduced until after
the derivative contracts were made; but it did violate the principles
and limits imposed by the European treaties. Greece concealed
relevant information from the market, which accordingly punished it
by lowering the country’s credit rating to a level that forced
international institutions to intervene as lender of last resort. The
expulsion or withdrawal of Greece from the Union would be
politically unsustainable, which will presumably help the other
peripheral EU member states with troubled finances (Portugal, Ireland
and Spain) in 2011.
The numerous revisions of the Greek public accounting data and
the subsequent crisis confirm that the incentives to cheat far exceeded
the potential cost. The condition for the rescue plan to succeed in the
medium term is that its costs have to exceed revenues. The austerity
plan to smooth debt and deficit has to be cheaper than debt bail-out.
At present part of the Greek debt is held by non-residents, and in the
event of default the loss could range from 30 to 50 per cent. Most
economic analyses see the solution in productivity improvements,
Tsatsiki connection: some reflections on Greece public debt crisis
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which can speed Greek economic growth and thus ease the burden of
debt. Such a structural overhaul can only come from national policy,
with reforms that so far are only minimally under way. 
The Greek crisis is the result of mismanagement, misreporting and
the circumvention of European rules. The entire cost will be borne by
Greece; the EU and the IMF intervened with credit at very low interest,
but not nil. Financial and accounting surveillance are still in progress,
but the Greek system is not yet in a position to assure the proper use
of resources. This confirms that the origin of the problems is the weak
governance of the European Union, which lacks a definite political
framework. 
BIBILIOGRAPHY
BIS, “The basic mechanics of FX swaps and cross-currency basis swaps,”
Quarterly Review, March 2008. (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0803z.htm)
European Central Bank, “Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU,”
Legal Working Paper no.10, December 2009. 
(http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf)
European Commission, Report on Greek government debt and deficit
statistics, 8 January 2010.
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/COM_2010_
REPORT_GREEK/EN/COM_2010_REPORT_GREEK-EN.PDF)
International Monetary Fund, “Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the
Interim Review Mission to Greece,” Press Release no. 10/246, 17 June 2010.
OLDANI, C., Govening Global Derivatives, Ashgate Publishing, November 2008
(http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&title_id=9091&edition_
id=11507&calcTitle=1)
OLDANI, C., and P. SAVONA, “Derivatives, fiscal policy and financial stability”,
ICFAI Journal of Derivatives Markets, vol. II no. 3, July 2005, pp. 7-25
PIGA, G., Derivatives and Public Debt Management, Council of Foreign
Relations, New York 2001.
Wall Street Journal, various issues (http://europe.wsj.com/home-page)
04 Oldani_Savona  17/01/11  11.58  Pagina 290
Appendix
The souvlaki connection:
some reflections on Greece public debt crisis
04 Oldani_Savona  17/01/11  11.58  Pagina 291
Chiara Oldani and Paolo Savona
292
























FIGURE 1. Euro/US dollar swap structure
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TABLE 1. Greek Government Deficit/Surplus and Debt levels
                                                                2006            2007            2008            2009
Net borrowing (-)/
net lending (+) as % of GDP                         -5.7%            -6.4%            -9.4%           -15.4%
General government consolidated
gross debt as % of GDP                            106.1%        105.0%         110.3%        126.8%
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority/Eurostat, UniCredit Research, November 2010.
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